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Extraterritorial powers, granted by the states to municipalities, al-
low municipalities to regulate conduct and provide services beyond
their borders. Nonresidents subject to such extraterritorial regula-
tion, however, lack the right to vote in the controlling municipal gov-
1. Extraterritorial powers involve municipal control over adjacent unincorporated
areas. Note, The Constitutionality ofthe Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Munici-
paliiies, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 151 (1977). These powers may be proprietary functions or
police functions. 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 5.11-.12 (1979).
An example of the former is the sale of water by a municipality to nonresidents.
Colorado Open Space Council, Inc. v. City of Denver, 190 Colo. 122, 543 P.2d 1258
(1975) (power to sell water within state enabling act). An example of the latter is the
arrest of persons by city police outside the city limits. Wright v. State, 134 Ga. App.
406, 214 S.E.2d 688 (1975) (upheld the arrest of a person driving while intoxicated by
an Atlanta policeman in an unincorporated territory).
The widespread use of municipal extraterritorial power is not a recent innovation.
The Greek city-state exercised broad control over surrounding territories, and, at
early common law, an English city had different jurisdictions for different purposes.
R. MADDOX, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 6-8 (1955). In the United States, 35 states provide municipalities with some
extraterritorial powers. Note, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial
Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 151 (1977).
Extraterritorial powers allow municipalities to control development on the urban
fringe with an eye toward future annexations. Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning. Rejiec.
lions on its Validiy, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 367, 372 (1957). Also, the city may need
to act outside its borders to provide services such as the provision of water to its
residents. There also may be a need to prevent negative externalities caused by nui-
sances beyond the city limits. See Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10
MINN. L. REV. 475 (1926). See also Crane v. Borough of Essex Fells, 67 N.J. Super.
83, 169 A.2d 845 (Ch. Div. 1961) (municipality allowed to conduct a 72-hour feasibil-
ity test for water provision outside its borders); Treadgill v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 658,
275 S.W.2d 658 (Crim. App. 1955) (upheld a ban on sale and use of fireworks within
5,000 feet of city limits because it represented a nuisance to city).
A reasonable alternative to granting extraterritorial powers is to alter municipal
boundaries to reflect the community needs. Failure to meet these needs has been
cited as the most critical problem facing metropolitan areas today. See F. SENO-
STOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA 70 (1962). For
financial or other reasons, however, persons residing beyond city limits may strongly
oppose inclusion, rendering this solution politically unfeasible. Bouwsma, The Valid-
ity of Extraterritorial Munipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REV. 806, 807 (1955).
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emnment's elections.2 In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,3 the
Supreme Court held that granting extraterritorial powers without ex-
tending the right to vote does not violate the federal equal protection
clause.4
Plaintiffs in Holt challenged Alabama's three-mile extraterritorial
-'police jurisdictions" surrounding municipalities with populations of
at least six thousand persons.5 Alabama statutes provide that police,
sanitary, and court authority extend into the regulated area.6 The
municipality also establishes licensing regulations for businesses,
trades, and professions existing within the police jurisdiction.7 Non-
residents8 alleged that the failure to extend the franchise to persons so
regulated infringed their fundamental right to vote in violation of
their constitutional right to equal protection.9 A three-judge court,
2. Without representation, nonresidents have not successfully challenged regula-
tion. Note, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Munici-
pahtes, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 151, 151 (1977). Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518
F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975) stands as the single exception to this rule. The court of
appeals found that the total power granted to organized counties over adjacent unor-
ganized counties unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to vote.
3. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
4. See notes 5-13 and accompanying text infra.
5. ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975).
6. ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975) provides, in part, that "[o]rdinances of a city or
town enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for
violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or town and in
the police jurisdiction thereof .. " A partial listing of Tuscaloosa's police and san-
itary regulations includes building codes and standards, mobile home park controls,
protection of certain birds, public health controls, traffic regulations, and criminal
ordinances. 439 U.S. at 82-84 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ALA, CODE § 12-14-1(b) (1975) grants the municipal court "jurisdiction [over] all
prosecutions for the breach of the ordinances of the municipality within its police
jurisdiction."
7. ALA. CODE § 11-51-91 (1975) provides "[alny city or town within the state of
Alabama may fix and collect licenses for any business, trade, or profession done
within the police jurisdiction of such city."
In addition to the powers already mentioned, the municipality also has important
extraterritorial planning functions not challenged in Holt. ALA. CODE §§ 11-52-8, 11-
52-30, 11-52-31 (1975). On the other hand, municipalities may not levy ad valorem
taxes, exercise eminent domain or zone property in the police jurisdiction. 439 U.S. at
72-73 n.8.
8. Plaintiffs, seven Holt residents and the Holt Civic Club, an unincorporated as-
sociation located within Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction, sought to represent all Ala-
bama residents subject to police jurisdiction. 525 F.2d 653, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1975).
9. In essence, the class argued that since residents of the municipality and resi-




convened by order of the court of appeals, dismissed the claim."0
The Supreme Court" held that the right to vote in municipal elec-
tions does not extend to non-geographic residents' 2 and that the stat-
utes are consistent with the equal protection clause. 3
The Supreme Court adopted a broad view of state power over po-
litical subdivisions in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.4 This view ac-
cords states "absolute discretion over where, when, and what powers
municipalities exercise," including extraterritorial powers.' Subse-
quent cases, however, required state delegations of power that pro-
vide for municipal classification to conform with equal protection
standards.' 6 The equal protection requirement involves the applica-
government, the state must show a compelling interest in denying the franchise to one
group. 439 U.S. at 66.
10. Plaintiffs sued under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976) which required a three-
judge district court to hear suits requesting enjoinment or enforcement of any state
statute on grounds of unconstitutionality. Parties could only proceed under this sec-
tion where the municipal officer charged is enforcing a state-wide policy. Moody v.
Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1967). The district court denied the motion to convene
such a court because the municipal officials lacked state-wide authority. Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 73-M-736 (case dismissed, N.D. Ala., July 31, 1975).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed because only municipal officials exercised the
state-created powers. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.
1975). On remand, a three-judge court dismissed the case for failure to request proper
relief. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 73-M-736 (case dismissed, N.D.
Ala., June 7, 1977). The Supreme Court heard the case on its merits because FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(c) requires federal courts to grant proper relief despite an improper prayer
for relief. 439 U.S. at 66.
11. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Stevens filed a
concurring opinion, and Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justices White and Mar-
shall, dissented. See note 44 infra.
12. The majority found that no previous voting rights case extended the right to
vote principles beyond the geographic boundary of a political subdivision and the
Court did not avail itself of the opportunity to do so. 439 U.S. at 68. See note 39
inira-
13. See note 17 infra.
14. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Hunter challenged the statutory majority required to ap-
prove an annexation. The statute required a majority of the total votes cast in the
annexing municipality and the area proposed for annexation to favor annexation.
This electoral scheme allowed an affirmative vote within a large municipality to over-
whelm the opposition in the area for annexation.
15. Id. at 178. The Court characterized municipal corporations as "convenient
agencies of the state" to which the state may delegate any powers over any area it
deems appropriate. The state constitution was the only limitation on the power to
delegate. Id. at 178-79.
16. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a statute changed a city geo-
graphically from a square to a 28-sided figure, effectively excluding all blacks from
[Vol. 19:292
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tion of two tests: strict scrutiny where the legislative classification af-
fects a fundamental right or suspect class, and rational relationship
for all other classifications.7
A major limitation on state power over political subdivisions was
the emergence of a fundamental right to vote doctrine, 8 first articu-
the city. The Court, finding that the statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment, held
that state power over municipalities, as well as any other state power, must be exer-
cised consistent with the United States Constitution. Id. at 344-45. See Comment,
Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Power Over Political Subdivisions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 704 (1961).
Subsequent cases comply with Gomillion. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elects., 383
U.S. 663 (1966), the Court struck down a state poll tax because it violated equal pro-
tection. In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), a Texas statute exacting fees from
primary candidates did not pass constitutional muster. Again, the Court required
state action to conform with the federal Constitution. Finally, in American Party v.
White. 415 U.S. 767 (1974) the Court struck down a statute providing that only the
names of the two major party candidates should appear on absentee ballots. Thus,
the extraterritorial powers granted by Alabama must conform with the Constitutional
provisions applied to the states.
17 See Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equaliy" Legislative Classifications, Deseg-
regation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 498 (1977). The strict
scrutiny test requires that the classification "promote a compelling governmental in-
terest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (struck down one-year state
residency requirement for welfare applicants because it interfered with the fundamen-
tal right to travel). Where the Court employs the rational relation test, equal protec-
tion "is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425
(1961) (upheld a Maryland Sunday Closing Law which exempted some businesses).
Scholars criticize the two test equal protection analysis on several grounds. First,
the Court is unable to define which interests are fundamental. Karst, The Supreme
Court 19 76 Term-Forward" Equal Citizensho Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977). Second, the inability of legislation employing suspect
classes or infringing upon fundamental rights to survive strict scrutiny, Dixon, supra,
at 503-04, leads to the conclusion that the standards are too inflexible. Yarbrough,
The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights On Protecting Fundamental and Not-So-
Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal Protec-
tion, 1977 DUKE L.J. 143, 144. Finally, some believe that the current equal protection
analysis is a wholly illegitimate mode of constitutional interpretation. Cf Linde, Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 253 (1975). Contra, Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) (present interpretation traced
back to the natural-rights tradition).
18. The importance of the right to vote is not a recent revelation. In Exparte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), the Supreme Court upheld statutes imposing crimi-
nal sanctions against persons infringing on another's right to vote. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), a case which struck down a statute restricting the
operation of laundries, the Court termed the right to vote a "fundamental right, pre-
servative of all rights." Despite this language, the Court allowed the collection of poll
taxes, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), and until the apportionment cases,




lated in the apportionment context.' 9 The apportionment cases de-
mand that each person's vote carry substantially the same impact on
the outcome of an election.2" This principle, "one person, one
vote, ' 'z  applies to all governmental apportionment.2' The right to
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1975); Comment, 4 Case Study in Equal
Protection: Voting Rights Decisions and a Pleafor Consistency, 70 Nw. L. REV. 934
(1976).
19. Early in the twentieth century, large segments of the rural population mi-
grated to urban areas. At the same time, rural legislators maintained disproportionate
control of Congress and state legislatures through refusals to reapportion, inaccurate
reapportionments, and shifts from population based apportionment plans to other ba-
ses. Thus, the apportionment cases responded to the inadequate legislative represen-
tation of urban areas. See Vocino, Morris & Gill, The Population Apportionment
Princile. Its Development and Application to Mississopi's State and Local Legislative
Bodies, 47 Miss. L.J. 943 (1976).
In the first important modern voting rights case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the Court held the apportionment cases justiciable. See generally McKay, Political
Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV.
645 (1963). In deciding the apportionment cases, the Court developed the content of
the fundamental right to vote. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 738
(1978).
20. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court struck down a non-popu-
lation based apportionment plan because the right to vote is fundamental. The Court
stated that "any alleged infringement of the right to vote must be carefully and metic-
ulously scrutinized." Id. at 562. Any dilution of the right to vote through apportion-
ment plans was considered antithetical to the principle of representative government.
Id. at 555.
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court struck down Georgia's con-
gressional districting whereby one congressman represented more than 800,000 per-
sons while another represented less than 300,000 persons. The Court stated that "[n]o
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we miust live." Id. that 17.
The Court concluded it was necessary for an apportionment scheme to give equal
numbers of voters equal representation. Id See generally Dixon, Reapportionment in
the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Strugglefor Fair Representation, 63
MICH. L. REv. 209 (1964); Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumbbells-Who'r
Afraid of Reapportionment, 75 YALE L.J. 1300 (1966).
21. Justice Douglas first stated this famous expression of the apportionment prin-
ciple in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (enjoined a state primary electoral sys-
tem whereby rural votes were overweighted). "The conception of political equality
• . . can mean only one thing--one person, one vote." Id. at 381.
22. E.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (apportionment of congressional
districts). In WMCA, Inc. v. Lorenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964), the Supreme Court struck
down an apportionment scheme for the New York legislature because of under-
representation of densely populated areas. Finally, in Hadley v. Junior College Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court struck down a junior college district apportionment plan
because of overrepresentation of less populous school districts. The Court summed
up the application of one man, one vote by stating: "Whenever a state or local govern-
ment decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions,
[Vol. 19:292
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vote does not have to be granted. Once it is, however, the right must
be accorded equally to all voters absent a compelling state interest.
23
A state may not infringe upon the fundamental right to vote
through arbitrary statutory definitions of residency. In Carrington v.
Rash,2 4 the Court struck down a statutory presumption which denied
residency to members of the armed forces serving in Texas and
thereby excluded them from the franchise. 25 Similarly, in Evans v.
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each quali-
fied voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election." Id. at
56. The Court does not, however, require state legislative apportionments to have the
same degree of voter equality as congressional apportionments. Walker, One Man-
One Vote: In Pursuit of an Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453, 461 (1976).
23 This characteristic distinguishes the fundamental right to vote from other fun-
damental rights. The existence of elections is irrelevant, but where they exist they
must be available equally to all voters. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
737 (1978). For example, in Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), the Court
upheld the selection of county school board members by delegates of local school
boards without regard to the relative population of local school districts. Since the
county chose not to elect county board members, the "one person, one vote" principle
was irrelevant. Id. at 111. The Court explicitly noted in San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973), that while there is no constitu-
tionally protected right to vote per se, there is a constitutionally protected right to
"participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever
the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any seg-
ment of the State's population." The Court upheld a property-based school finance
system whereby areas with low land values have correspondingly underfinanced
school systems.
The characterization of the ight to vote as fundamental requires the state to show a
compelling interest in any statute which infringes upon that right. Wall, EqualProtec-
lion: Analzing the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 163, 163-65 (1977). Thus, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elects., 383
U.S. 663 (1966). the Court struck down a poll tax because the state could not prove
any relationship between wealth and voting qualifications. In Dunn v. Blumstead,
405 U.S. 330 (1972), a 15-month residency requirement did not withstand strict scru-
tiny. The Court held that prevention of fraud and insuring knowledgeable voters
could not justify the length of the limitation. Id. at 345. The Court also stated, how-
ever, that "bona fide residence" requirements could withstand strict scrutiny because
they are "necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community." Id. at
343-44. Thus, in Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), the Court upheld a 50-day
durational residency requirement.
24 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
25. Id. at 93. The state asserted that the statute protected small civilian communi-
ties which might be drowned out at the polls by military personnel, and protected the
"franchise from infiltration by transients." Id. The conclusive presumption that de-
fined mihtary personnel as nonresidents violated equal protection. The Court refused
to disenfranchise military personnel simply because their political views and interests




Cornman,26 the Court held that a state must grant the right to vote to
persons living on a federal reservation within the state." The Court
refused to allow "fictional" state-drawn boundaries to interfere with
an interested person's right to vote.28
Municipalities, on several occasions, have successfully defended
denials of the right to vote by asserting that the nonvoting class had
no interest in the election. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No.
5,29 for example, New York limited the right to vote to owners of
taxable realty and parents or guardians of school children.30 Apply-
ing a strict scrutiny test, the Court found that the classification un-
constitutionally infringed upon the right to vote since all district
residents had some interest in the quality of the school district.3'
After Kramer, the Court denied states the right to limit the franchise
in bond referendums to property owners or to taxpayers because all
residents had an interest in the bonds.32
26. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
27. The enclave was a National Institute of Health research facility subject to
congressional power. In 1953, Maryland ceded jurisdiction over the enclave to the
United States and subsequently disenfranchised the enclave residents. Id. at 420-21.
The Court applied strict scrutiny in striking down the statute because a "State may
not dilute a person's vote ... and a lesser rule could hardly be applicable to a com-
plete denial" of the franchise. Id. at 423. -,
28. The state asserted that because Congress controlled the enclave residents, they
had no interest in state elections. Congress, however, previously granted the states
substantial control over federal enclaves. Enclave residents were, for example, subject
to state taxes, criminal laws, and jurisdiction in state courts, and used the state's
school system. Id. at 424. These facts provided strong support for the Court's deci-
sion to disregard fictional boundaries. Id. at 421-22.
29. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
30. Under the New York statute, voters had to meet one of three requirements in
addition to the usual eligibility requirements for voting in local elections: own or
lease, or be the spouse of the owner or lessor of property taxable for school purposes;
be the parent of a child presently in school; or, be the guardian of a child presently in
school. Id. at 633-34.
31. The Court applied strict scrutiny because statutes discriminating against the
right to vote offend the legitimacy of government. Id. at 626. The Court found that
persons precluded from voting may have a greater interest than some persons allowed
to vote and struck down the statute. Id. at 632.
32. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam). In Coriano, the
Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down a statute limiting the franchise in a
municipal utility bond referendum to payers of property tax. Since the operation of
the utility affected all city residents, the city could not limit the franchise. Id. at 705.
Similarly, in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), the Court invali-
dated a restriction which allowed only property owners the right to vote in a general
obligation bond election. Using strict scrutiny, the Court noted a difference in interest
[Vol, 19:292
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Two Supreme Court cases, however, have upheld the denial of the
right to vote to groups of citizens where the Court found that the
persons had no interest in the election. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.,"3 the Court upheld a statute permit-
ting only landowners the right to vote for directors of the water dis-
trict. 4 Since the water district only had a limited purpose that
disproportionately affected landowners, the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny." The Court employed the same rationale in Associated En-
terprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist. 36 to uphold a
statute allowing only landowners to vote in referendums on approval
between property owners and non-owners but held that both groups were interested
and must be granted the right to vote. Id. at 209, 212.
33. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
34 In addition to limiting the franchise the statute distributed votes among land-
owners according to the value of their property. Id. at 725. Notwithstanding the one
man, one vote cases, the Court deemed this voting scheme rational since it distributed
the vote in proportion to the benefits and burdens incurred. Assessment for the cost
of the project was proportional to the size of landholdings. Id. at 734.
35. The Salver decision was problematic. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
dissent, noted that flooding resulted from past water district decisions not to activate
water diversion machinery at appropriate times. These floods adversely affected land-
owners and nonlandowners alike. Thus, nonlandowners had as much interest as the
disenfranchised voters in Kramer. Id. at 737-39.
Another difficulty with Salyer is its use of the rational relation test. After Salyer,
where the election involves a general governmental unit, courts applied strict scrutiny
to test the validity of limitations on the right to vote, but applied the rational relation
test in cases involving special governmental units. See Garton, One Person, One Vote
in Special District Elections Two Ideas and an Illustration, 20 S.D.L. REv. 245, 255
(1975). The use of different standards of review depending on the type of governmen-
tal unit involved, although historically grounded, is not logical. See Lee, Mr. Herbert
Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,
15 ARiz. L. REV. 457, 475 (1973).
Although the Court in Kramer suggested that there may be appropriate cases for
interest-based limitation, 395 U.S. at 632, it seems clear that Salyer was not what the
Court had in mind. "Salver is inconsistent with the attempt in Kramer to encourage
greater voter participation," Comment, Equal Protection: Analyzing the Dimensions of
a Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 163, 175 (1977),
and violates the rule in Kramer requiring interested parties to vote. Note, Constitu-
tional Law--Voter Equaiity--Equal Protection--Special Purpose Unit Exception to
One-Man One-Vote, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 253.
The inconsistencies between Kramer and Salyer make the two cases difficult to
reconcile. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 637 (1978). Nonetheless, in Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975) (statute giv-
ing property owners disproportionate strength in bond election found unconstitu-
tional) the Court upheld the special interest distinction between Kramer and Salver.




of the formation of watershed districts.37
All the cases enforcing the fundamental right of citizens to vote
involved geographic residents interested in the election.38 Holt is the
first case to consider the right of interested nonresidents to vote.3 9
The Court reviewed its past decisions and, finding no case supporting
nonresident voting rights, concluded that municipalities may limit
the franchise to residents.4" The Court reasoned that if the funda-
mental right to vote applied to nonresidents affected by municipal
activity, the right to vote could never be contained.4 Finding no
fundamental right, the Court applied the rational relationship test. 2
Noting the wide latitude granted states over political subdivisions in
Hunter,4 3 the Court concluded that the use of extraterritorial powers
was a rational legislative response to the need for services in unincor-
porated territories.'
Previous cases, however, held that the fundamental right to vote
required that the franchise include both groups where two groups
37. Because of its characterization of watershed districts as special purpose units,
id. at 744, the Court applied a rational relation test and concluded that landowners
had a disproportionate interest. Id. at 745.
38. The apportionment cases involved residents of the relevant government unit.
The disenfranchised soldiers in Carrington resided in the state and municipality in
which they sought to vote. In Evans, while the state characterized enclave inhabitants
as nonresidents, they were geographically situated within Maryland's borders. Fi-
nally, the disenfranchised persons in Kramer resided within the school district.
39. Holt's inhabitants are police jurisdiction residents living beyond the geo-
graphic boundaries of Tuscaloosa. 439 U.S. at 61-62.
40. Id. at 66-69.
41. The Court's argument was that municipal government decisions always affect,
whether directly or indirectly, persons living on the municipal fringe and that "no one
would suggest that nonresidents" indirectly affected should vote. Id. at 69. While
this may be true, the Court fails to explain why persons subject to direct purposeful
control should not vote.
42. Id. at 70-75. The holding in Kramer, modified by Salver, however, is that
strict scrutiny applies to limitations on voting for general governmental elections.
Clearly, the city of Tuscaloosa is such a unit, and the Court should have applied
Kramer.
43. Id. at 71. The Court failed to explain why the state delegation challenged in
Holt should receive greater deference than previous cases allowed. See notes 14-16
and accompanying text supra.
44. 439 U.S. at 75. In addition, the Court found it was rational for Alabama to
grant municipalities a certain degree of control over an area of potential annexation.
Mr. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, suggested that no infringement of
the fundamental right to vote had occurred since Holt residents still elected county
and state officials. Id. at 77. This was equally true of the plaintiffs in Kramer, how-
ever. Also, since the ability to vote in more elections grants Tuscaloosa a greater
(Vol. 19:292
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS
had the same interest in an election.45 In Holt, the same police and
sanitary ordinances regulated the lives of residents and nonresidents
alike. Similarly, municipal court jurisdiction extended to both
groups. The pervasiveness of the city's extraterritorial power led the.
dissent to conclude that the interest of nonresidents in Holt surpassed
the interest of the disenfranchised residents in Kramer.4 6 Thus, fol-
lowing the rule in Kramer, the right to vote in city elections should
extend to the police jurisdiction residents.
The Holt court failed to analyze the interests of residents and non-
residents in the city's government. The Court stated that since Holt
plaintiffs resided in the police jurisdiction and not within the geo-
graphic bounds of the city, no fundamental right to vote existed.
Prior cases, however, disregarded geographic lines where the interests
of residents and nonresidents were the same.4 7
The Court admitted, nonetheless, that if a municipality exercises
"precisely the same governmental powers over" nonresidents as it ex-
ercises over residents, both groups must vote.48 Thus, the Court
degree of control over elected officials, Mr. Justice Stevens' argument fails when mea-
sured against the one person, one vote principle.
The dissent correctly argues that state characterizations of residency may not deny
equal protection and that Holt residents have a clear interest in Tuscaloosa elections.
Thus, they should have the right to vote. Id. at 86-88.
45. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
46. 439 U.S. at 85. The disenfranchised group in Kramer only had an interest in
the general well-being of the community because they were neither property-owners
whose taxes paid for the operation of the school district nor parents or guardians of
school children. Unlike the Kramer case, Tuscaloosa's government directly regulated
the police jurisdiction residents in Holt. Thus, the quality of government in Tusca-
loosa concerned and affected the Holt residents.
47. In Evans, see notes 27-28 supra, the Court required scrutiny of the interests of
state-defined nonresidents and residents. Where these interests are the same, state
residency requirements violate equal protection. The Court distinguished Evans, be-
cause the disenfranchised group in Evans lived within the borders of Maryland, while
the disenfranchised group in Holt lived outside the borders of the governmental unit
involved. 439 U.S. at 67-68. This distinction is unacceptable since the disen-
franchised group in both cases challenged a state-defined residency requirement.
Equal protection dictates that if the same political subdivision governs both groups,
then each group has the right to vote in political subdivision elections regardless of
the side of the state-drawn line on which they live.
48. Id. at 72, 73 n.8. Thus, the Court draws the line on extraterritorial powers
where they amount to an annexation "in all but name." Id. Should the Supreme
Court require only a rational relationship to limit the franchise, this result is not re-
quired. A limitation of a city's franchise to its more densely populated core is ration-





evinces a willingness to subjugate nonresidents to the will of residents
so long as a state shrewdly withholds a single power from the extra-
territorial delegation.49 To prevent this result, the Court should dis-
regard the geographic lines and weigh the interests of residents and
nonresidents under equal protection principles.
After Holt, a state may deny a citizen his fundamental right to vote
for representatives who govern his life. State-drawn boundaries now
have a degree of significance which had been previously denied.
While the Court did not overrule Kramer and its progeny, their con-
tinued viability is uncertain.5"
A major facet of the fundamental right to vote is the guaranty that
interested parties may voice their opinions in elections. Persons
should not be subjected to the decisions of forums from which they
are excluded. Only where there is a compelling state interest should
this right be compromised. By denying Holt residents the right to
vote, the Court has eroded this fundamental right.
Steven F Gulman
49. For example, the state may grant a municipality total control over adjacent
territory except for the provision of fire prevention and control. Thus, while the mu-
nicipality may not put out fires or regulate associated hazards, it may tax the "nonres-
idents," putting such revenues to uses determined by a government elected by
"residents." Further, the "nonresidents" must abide by a host of regulations enacted
by the "resident" elected government. It is clear that such a government does not
represent or necessarily service the needs, interests, or desires of "nonresidents," and
is antithetical to American notions of democracy.
50. The Saoler case limited Kramer to general governmental units. Holt limited
Kramer to persons living within those general governmental units. The Court seems
to be limiting Kramer to its facts.
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